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INTRODUCTION

When Argentina's central bank, Banco Central de la Argentina, attempted to unilaterally reschedule $1.3 billion of dollar-denominated bonds,' three bond holders, a Swiss bank, and two Pan1. In 1986, Argentina's President issued a decree empowering the Ministry of Economy
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amanian corporations, rejected the rescheduling and sued for
specific performance in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York.2 The foreign plaintiffs asserted
that the federal district court had subject matter jurisdiction based
on their election to receive payment in New York under a place of
payment option in the debenture.3
Argentina and Banco Central 4 moved to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, seeking refuge under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 ("FSIA").5 The district court denied
the motion, applying the "direct effect" clause of the FSIA "commercial activity" exception 6 to Banco Central's bond issuance and
failure to pay.7
Argentina and Banco Central appealed, arguing the public necessity of their actions in view of Argentina's economic crisis. The
to direct Banco Central to establish alternative means of debt repayment:
Whereas the country continues to have insufficient currency reserves to handle
all the maturities of principal and interest of the Public Sector, including those
corresponding to [dollar bonds referred to as] "Bonods" and "Promissory Notes"
and therefore it has become necessary to continue implementing an ordered system of allocating scarce currencies giving equal and impartial treatment to all
creditors within the general framework of negotiations of the foreign debt.
Presidential Decree No. 772 cited in Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 16, Weltover, Inc. v.
Republic of Argentina, 941 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 60 U.S.L.W. 3388 (U.S.
Jan. 10, 1992) (No. 91-763).
2. The three bond holders held $1,330,000 in bonds. Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Argentina, 753 F. Supp. 1201, 1203 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd 941 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1991).
3. Weltover, 941 F.2d at 147. The option provision gave the holder of the bond the
choice of New York, London, Frankfurt, or Zurich as the place of payment. Weltover, 753 F.
Supp. at 1203.
4. For a criticism of the Weltover district court's treatment of Argentina as the alter
ego of Banco Central, see Joseph D. Pizzurro, Sovereign Immunity-CommercialActivity of
Foreign State Having Direct Effect in the United States-Forum Non Conveniens, 85 AM.
J. INT'L L. 560, 563-64 (1991).
5. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(a)(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (West 1973 &
Supp. 1991).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). The Act provides, in pertinent part that:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the States in any case(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in
the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the
United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign
state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States
in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state and that
act causes a direct effect in the United States.
Id. (emphasis added).
7. Weltover, 753 F. Supp. at 1206-07.
8. Weltover, 941 F.2d at 147-48. Argentina was unable to service its debt without con-
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United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held, affirmed: The district court correctly applied the commercial activity
exception to find jurisdiction where Argentina and Banco Central
entered the marketplace as commercial actors and breached a commercial contract directly affecting foreign corporate plaintiffs in
the United States by depriving them of their contractual rights to
receive dollar payments in New York. Weltover v. Republic of Argentina, 941 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 60 U.S.L.W.
3388 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1992) (No. 91-763).
In stripping Argentina of its foreign sovereign immunity, the
Weltover court engaged in a two-step inquiry. First, it had to determine "whether the act of a foreign sovereign in issuing debt instruments to foreign creditors for the stated purpose of controlling
the nation's stock of foreign currency is 'commercial activity'"
under the FSIA.9 To do so, the court isolated the bond issuance as
a clearly commercial activity, rejecting its characterization as a
purely sovereign function involving currency controls.10 The court
reasoned that when Argentina and Banco Central embarked in the
"stream of international commerce," they irrevocably established
themselves as commercial actors." Hence, Argentina's subsequent
failure to fulfill its contractual obligations retained its commercial
2
character for the purposes of the FSIA.1
For the sovereign immunity exception to apply to commercial
activity that did not actually occur in the United States, the FSIA
requires that the activity have a "direct effect in the United
States."" Therefore, the second step in the Weltover analysis was
to determine whether Argentina's commercial activity had "a sufficient nexus with the United States to justify the exercise of subject
matter jurisdiction over the foreign sovereign in an American
court." The court easily found that Argentina's breach of contract caused a "direct financial loss" to the plaintiffs-a "direct
effect."' 5 Placing that effect "in the United States' 6 to satisfy substant currency devaluations; however, these devaluations created further problems for private companies requiring hard currencies to pay their foreign debt. Argentina then created a
program promising to allocate precious hard currency reserves to these private companies,
but was later unable to fulfill the promises. Id.
9. Id. at 146.
10. Id. at 150-51. See infra part III.
11. Weltover, 941 F.2d at 151.
12. Id.
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
14. Weltover, 941 F.2d at 147.
15. Id. at 152.
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ject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA was, however, more difficult. The corporate plaintiffs lacked any contacts with the United
17
States forum other than the contractual place of payment option.
Nonetheless, the Weltover court found that Argentina's failure to
perform its contractual obligation to make payments in New York
caused a direct effect sufficiently in the United States to establish
the "statutorily mandated nexus. '" 18
This Note argues that Weltover clarifies the law of foreign
sovereign immunity as it pertains to government borrowing. This
clarification should allow the courts to adapt the FSIA to increasing global economic interdependence without altering the Act's intended purposes: uniformity of application and certainty in judicial application of the restrictive doctrine of foreign sovereign
immunity.
Part II examines the broad Congressional objectives in codifying the restrictive doctrine of sovereign immunity and introduces
the relevant portions of the Act. Part III considers the "commercial activity" component of the FSIA. It looks at where the courts
have strayed in this area and at Weltover's reaffirmation of the
statutory mandate to look to the nature, not the purpose of the
activity to determine its commercial nature.
Part IV then discusses the second component, the "direct effect" clause of section 1605(a)(2). It demonstrates that Weltover's
approach to direct effect analysis finds useful analogues in traditional contract and choice-of-law principles as well as in public
policy. It argues that this flexible approach is more closely in line
with congressional goals of uniformity and certainty than the subjective "substantial and foreseeable" test used by other courts. Finally, Part V suggests a means of reconciling the circuits through
the "legally significant act" standard of Zedan v. Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia.1 9

16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Weltover, 941 F.2d at 151 (citing Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 312 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982)).
19. 849 F.2d 1511 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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A.
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BACKGROUND

CongressionalIntent

The House Report states four objectives of the FSIA.2 0 The
first was to codify the "restrictive" theory of sovereign immunity.2 '
The "restrictive" theory first made the distinction between suits
involving a foreign sovereign's public acts (jure imperii) where immunity would be granted, and those involving a foreign sovereign's
commercial or private acts (jure gestionis) where it would not. 2
The second objective was to "insure that this restrictive prin2' 3
ciple of immunity is applied in litigation before U.S. courts.
This relates to one of the primary purposes of the FSIA, which was
to transfer sovereign immunity determinations from the State Department to the judiciary with the goal of making uniform and
consistent decisions based on "purely legal grounds" 4 without political pressure from foreign governments2 5 The third and fourth
objectives do not relate directly to the direct effect determination
itself. But they do demonstrate congressional intent to liberalize
the previously hardlined refusal to assist injured or contractually
deprived plaintiffs. 6
The FSIA's third objective was to "provide a statutory procedure for making service upon, and obtaining in personam jurisdiction over, a foreign state."' 27 The FSIA meets this objective by
merging personal jurisdiction with subject matter jurisdiction upon
proper service of process. 28 Congress intended this "broad jurisdiction ' 29 to lead to "uniformity in decision, which is desirable since
the disparate treatment of cases involving foreign governments
20. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 19 (1976), reprinted in 1976

U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604 [hereinafter

HOUSE REPORT].

21. Id. at 7.
22. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor to the Department of State, to
Philip B. Perlman, Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 984 (1952). See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 20, at 7-8.
23. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 20, at 7.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See id. at 8 (discussing the evolution from the absolute doctrine of sovereign immunity of the first half of the century, under which a sovereign was completely immune from
suit).
27. Id.
28. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(b), 1605(b), 1608.
29. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 20, at 13.

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:2

may have adverse foreign relations consequences.""0
The FSIA's fourth objective was to "provide judgment creditors some remedy, if, after a reasonable period, a foreign state or
enterprise failed to satisfy a final judgment."3' The FSIA provides
several exceptions to the previously absolute immunity of foreign
sovereigns from attachment or execution. 2 Thus, not only did
Congress "encourage the bringing of actions against foreign
states," 3 but it also sought to ensure that foreign sovereigns not
escape liability through political means.
Taken together, the broad objectives reveal an overall design
with a common theme of liberality in applying the FSIA to foreign
sovereigns dealing in the commercial realm. By de-politicizing the
authority to grant sovereign immunity, Congress attempted to
open up the courts to injured plaintiffs in need of relief."
B.

Commercial Activity Exception

The FSIA provides three possible exceptions to sovereign immunity within the category of commercial activity. A sovereign
loses its immunity when:
a commercial activity carried on in
the action is based upon [i]
the United States by the foreign state; or [ii] upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or [iii] upon an act
outside the territory of the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act
causes a direct effect in the United States.35
The threshold inquiry in determining the applicability of these
three exceptions is thus whether the sovereign has conducted a
commercial activity.3 6 If the court does not find a commercial activity, the inquiry ends; the sovereign is immune from suit in U.S.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 8.
32. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1610, 1611.
33. HoUSE REPORT, supra note 20, at 13.
34. See Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300,
312 (2d Cir. 1981) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982) (the goal of Congress was to open the
courthouse door to parties wronged by the commercial acts of a sovereign state); see also
Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 490 (1982).
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (emphasis added).
36. See Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300,
308 (2d Cir. 1981).
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courts. If, however, the court finds that the sovereign has engaged
in commercial activity, it goes on to determine if that activity falls
within one of the section 1605(a)(2) exceptions.
III.

THE

THRESHOLD: COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY

The FSIA defines "commercial activity" as "either a regular
course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act."'3 7 As if to remove any ambiguity, the FSIA adds that
"[tihe commercial character of an activity shall be determined by
reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose."38 Congress
prefaced these definitions with a declaration of purpose, explaining
that the FSIA is based on the principle of reciprocity of international law under which no state is "immune from the jurisdiction
of foreign courts insofar as [its] commercial activities are concerned."39 This principle suggests that once the court finds a commercial activity to exist, the FSIA should be interpreted liberally 0
to grant subject matter jurisdiction.
Of utmost importance to Congress was consistency in the law
of foreign sovereign immunity.4 ' Although avoiding an "excessively
precise definition of the term,""'2 the FSIA congressional guidelines
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d).
38. Id.
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (emphasis added). Even before the FSIA was enacted, legal'scholars argued that the increasing involvement of governments in international trade and economics required adjustments to "[tihe basic principles and concepts of international law,

including the rules of sovereign immunity."

THEODORE R. GIUTTARI, THE AMERICAN LAW OF
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: AN ANALYSIS OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 276 (1970).

Prior to 1952, the U.S. granted complete immunity to foreign sovereigns unless the
State Department approved the claim against the foreign sovereign. See Verlinden B.V. v.
Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983). In 1952, the State Department restricted
this immunity to public acts and excluded commercial acts. Id. at 487.
Argentina follows the U.S. pre-FSIA procedure in Article 24 of the Argentine Code of
Civil and Commercial Procedure. Claims against foreign sovereigns are adjudicated only if
the foreign sovereign consents to submit to proceedings or the executive branch of the Argentine government declares that there is no reciprocity with that foreign sovereign. GAMAL

M.

BADR, STATE IMMUNITY: AN ANALYTICAL AND PROGNOSTIC VIEW

162 n.62 (1984).

40. See National American Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622, 638
(S.D.N.Y.) (noting that "liberal standards for acquiring in personam jurisdiction ... find
their quid pro quo in elimination of jurisdictional attachments"), af'd, 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir.
1978).
41. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 20, at 32-33 (explaining the reason for the right of removal to a federal court). See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480
(1982).
42. House Report, supra note 20, at 16 (discussing § 1603(d)).
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do list several examples of foreign governmental acts constituting
"commercial activity." Among them are government sales of services or products, leasing property, borrowing money, and invest43
ing in securities of U.S. corporations.
The circuits uniformly agree on the "private person" test,
which labels sovereign activity as commercial "if the activity is one
in which a private person could engage." 44 However, this test may
lead to inconsistencies when the courts encounter situations in
which foreign sovereigns engage in "private" acts that appear inextricably interwoven with "public" or governmental functions.
Philosophically, the problem is definitional, for "[o]ften the essence of an act is defined by its purpose."4 5
For example, a foreign government or its central bank that expropriates property, issues currency controls, and seeks private foreign investment may have as a unified goal the economic recovery
of the country, but the issuance of commercial paper in pursuit of
that goal is a commercial activity. 4" An economic recovery plan is
governmental in nature, but the implementation of that plan may
involve commercial activity.47
If strictly applied, the congressional directive to look to the
nature, not the purpose of an activity to determine whether it is
''commercial activity," is a reliable guide in "mixed" public-private
activities. In the seminal case, Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v.
Federal Republic of Nigeria,"' the court applied this directive to
the Nigerian government's contract to purchase cement from a
U.S. trading company. The court found that entering into a con43. Id. In its discussion of the direct effect clause of § 1605(a)(2), the House Report
provides no specific examples of activity abroad that might have a direct effect in the U.S.
However, nothing indicates that such activity would not also include public debt issuance.
Id. at 19. And as Weltover notes, the House Report expressly states that the courts have "a
great deal of latitude" in determining commercial activity. Id. at 16.
44. Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 309. The Seventh Circuit claims that the Second Circuit has inappropriately added the requirement that the foreign sovereign have a profit motive. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Ctr. v. Hellenic Republic, 877 F.2d 574, 578 n.4
(7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied 493 U.S. 937 (1989) (interpreting Letelier v. Republic of Chile,
748 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1125 (1985)). The Weltover court set the
record straight, stating that the inquiry as to "whether the activity is of the type an individual would customarily carry on for profit . . . did not go so far as to require a profit motive
on the part of the foreign sovereign." Weltover, 941 F.2d at 150.
45. De Sanchez v. Republic of Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1393 (5th Cir. 1985).
46. See West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 825 (9th Cir.) cert. denied,
482 U.S. 906 (1987).
47. Segni v. Commercial Office of Spain, 835 F.2d 160, 165 (7th Cir. 1987).
48. 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
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tract to procure cement was a commercial activity falling within
the FSIA, even though the governmental purpose-to build army
barracks or roads-was easily characterized as sovereign in nature. 9 Just four months before Weltover, in Shapiro v. Republic of
Bolivia," the Second Circuit applied the nature/purpose directive
to the issuance of public debt by a foreign sovereign."
In Shapiro, the Bolivian government sought the return of
nearly $81 million in bearer notes issued to its previously appointed agent in the United States.2 The notes represented payment for fifty-two Starfighter jets.5 Because the U.S. Department
of State refused to grant the necessary transfer license, the transaction was never consummated. The agent failed to return the
notes to the Bolivian government as agreed.5 4 Through a series of
questionable transactions,5 5 Mr. David Shapiro obtained one of the
notes and sued Bolivia, its air force, and its central bank, in the
southern district of New York to collect on the note.6 The district
court dismissed Shapiro's suit for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction."
The Second Circuit reversed, holding that the court had subject matter jurisdiction under the first clause of section
1605(a)(2).8 On the initial question of what constituted a commer49. Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 310.
50. 930 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1991).
51. Id. at 1018.
52. Nineteen of the 40 notes were returned to Bolivia voluntarily and Bolivia received a

judgment in the southern district of New York for return of the other 21 notes. Comptroller
General v. Int'l Promotions and Ventures, Ltd., 618 F. Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
53. Shapiro, 930 F.2d at 1015.
54. Id.
55. The Second Circuit, although not addressing the merits, hinted that "Shapiro

[must] surmount the formidable hurdle presented by the claim that he is not a bona fide
purchaser .
Id. at 1016.
56. Shapiro, 1990 WL 100908, at *2.
57. Shapiro successfully argued to the appointedmagistrate that Bolivia's previous suit

created an implied waiver of sovereign immunity under 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(1), but the district
court disagreed with the recommendation due to the lack of privity between Shapiro's acquisition of the note and Bolivia's issuance of the note. Shapiro v. Republic of Bolivia, No.
86 CIV. 9935, 1990 WL 100908, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 1990). The district court further
held that because the note was issued in Bolivia and could only be presented there for
payment, Shapiro's action was not "clearly based upon commercial activity of Bolivia in the
United States." Id.
58. "[I]n which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United

States by a foreign state ...." 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). The Shapiro court upheld the district court's ruling on the waiver issue, but reversed on the "substantial contact" language of
§ 1603(e). 930 F.2d at 1016, 1018. Because the case turned on the commercial activity of the

Bolivian agents in the United States, Shapiro did address direct effect under the third
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cial activity, the Shapiro court declared that "[i]t is self-evident
that issuing public debt is a commercial activity within the meaning of Section 1605(a)(2)." 5 9 Because the statute expressly requires
that only the nature of the transaction be considered and not the
purpose,"0 the court looked to the act of issuing the notes rather
than its purpose-supporting Bolivia's national defense.6 1
The difficulty that results from ignoring the statutory direc62
tive is illustrated by De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua,
on which the Weltover defendants relied to support the theory
that the administration of Argentina's money supply was a
"quintessentially sovereign" activity." In De Sanchez, the wife of
President Somoza's close friend and former Minister of Defense,
cashed in a certificate of deposit three years before its maturity
date." She received a check for $150,000 from the central bank
just before the victory of the Sandinista revolutionaries. 5 Not surprisingly, the central bank, controlled by the not-yet-official
Sandinista regime, placed a stop-payment order on the check. 6
Mrs. Sanchez sued the central bank to collect on the check.6
The De Sanchez court faced a quandary: it could treat the
central bank's issuance of the check as a sale of foreign currency-a commercial activity; or it could treat it as the regulation
of Nicaragua's foreign exchange reserves-a sovereign activity."'
The court refused to separate the "nature" from the "purpose":
Indeed, we do not believe that an absolute separation is always
possible between the ontology and the teleology of an act. Often,
the essence of an act is defined by its purpose-gift-giving, for
clause of § 1605(a)(2).
59. Shapiro, 930 F.2d at 1018.
60. 28 U.S.C. 1603(d).
61. Shapiro, 930 F.2d at 1019.
62. 770 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1985).
63. Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 21, Weltover (No. 91-7119).
64. Mrs. Sanchez purchased the CD, payable in U.S. dollars, from a privately-owned
bank in Nicaragua. De Sanchez, 770 F.2d at 1387.
Just prior to De Sanchez, both the Second Circuit and the Fifth Circuit had refused to
allow the exchange control regulations of Mexico to de-commercialize the issuance' of CDs
by Mexican banks, which while privately-owned at the time of the issuance were later nationalized due to the decline in world oil prices. Braka v. Bancomer, S.A., 589 F. Supp. 1465,
1470 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd on other grounds, 762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1984); Callejo v. Bancomer,
S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1109 (5th Cir. 1985).
65. De Sanchez, 770 F.2d at 1387-88.
66. Id. at 1388.
67. Id. at 1389.
68. Id. at 1397.
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example. Unless we can inquire into the purposes of such acts,
we cannot determine their nature. Indeed commercial acts
themselves are defined largely by reference to their purpose."9
The court held that the central bank's actions were sovereign activity because the government did not enter the marketplace as a
commercial actor when issuing the check. 70 Thus, the subsequent
breach, the failure to honor the check, retained its sovereign character, immunizing the central bank from suit.7 1 The De Sanchez
court's failure to follow the statutory mandate removed an otherwise facially commercial CD redemption from the realm of commercial activity.
Weltover's "commercial activity" analysis is straightforward.
Reiterating the congressional mandate to look to the "nature" of
commercial activity, rather than its "purpose, ' 72 Weltover establishes a bright-line rule: A foreign sovereign who issues public debt
instruments is engaged in a commercial activity for the purposes of
the FSIA.73 This perfectly sensible approach 4 finds support in the
language of the FSIA, 71 its legislative history, 76 and most decisional
law on the issue.
Weltover avoids the ontological dilemma perpetuated by De
Sanchez 77 with a rule of exclusion: "When the nature of an act is
transparent by reference merely to the type of activity, the purpose should not bear on the outcome. ' ' 7 The nature of selling securities in the international public market to private parties is patently commercial activity. Hence, Argentina's purpose in selling
the securities was irrelevant to the commercial nature of its
79
activity.
69. Id. at 1393 (emphasis added). The early redemption of a certificate of deposit in a
country depleted of dollar reserves is "indeed" a gift of the government.
70. Id. at 1394.
71. Id.
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d).
73. Weltover, 941 F.2d at 151.
74. The Weltover court calls its "commercial activity" approach "pragmatic." Weltover,
941 F.2d at 149.
75. "The commercial character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the
nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to
its purpose." 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (emphasis added).
76. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 20, at 19.
77. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
78. Weltover, 941 F.2d at 150.'
79. Weltover's rule of exclusion does not necessarily collide with De Sanchez. The
Weltover court admits that a government may contract in its "sovereign capacity."
Weltover, 941 F.2d at 151. Arguably, the Nicaraguan government, in the throes of a revolu-
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Like maintenance of an air force in Shapiro,or building infrastructure in Texas Trading, fiscal management, including currency
control regulations, is of a sovereign nature. However, "the implementation of that policy through the issuance of commercial paper
is not" sovereign activity.80 Weltover clearly establishes that, for
FSIA purposes, when a sovereign issues commercial paper to finance its governmental objectives, the activity is commercial regardless of the ultimate use or regulation of the funds obtained.
By adhering to the language of the statute, Weltover furthers
congressional goals of uniformity and certainty by ensuring consistent judicial application of the FSIA in the area of public debt issuance. It follows Texas Trading and most other courts that have
faced similar cases.8 1 Possibly, however, its most important virtue
is simplicity. If De Sanchez demonstrated anything, it was the futility of trying to make any principled distinction by defining action, acted in its sovereign capacity in De Sanchez when it permitted the wife of a highlyplaced government official to redeem a CD years prior to its maturity: unusual government
action under extraordinary circumstances.
One could, of course, argue that, like the political situation in Nicaragua which gave rise
to the De Sanchez case, the debt crisis in Argentina could also be characterized as an extreme circumstance. See Affidavit of Argentine Financial Representative Daniel Marx,
Weltover (No. 91-7119) (from which Weltover takes its statement of facts describing the
financial crisis in Argentina); Weltover, 941 F.2d at 147-48. But the commercial nature of
the Weltover transactions is far more palpable than the occurrence in De Sanchez. In
Weltover, the foreign sovereign specifically designed a plan to raise dollar reserves by inducing private parties outside its sphere of governmental control to rely on a clause providing
for repayment in New York.
80. Weltover, 753 F. Supp. at 1206 (citing West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 807
F.2d 820, 825 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 906 (1987); Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764
F.2d 1101, 1109-10 (5th Cir. 1985); Braka v. Bancomer, S.A., 589 F. Supp. 1465, 1470
(S.D.N.Y. 1984)).
81. Weltover, 941 F.2d at 150. See, e.g., Chisholm & Co. v. Bank of Jamaica, 643 F.
Supp. 1393, 1400 (S.D. Fla. 1986). See also Practical Concepts, Inc. v. Republic of Bolivia,
811 F.2d 1543, 1550 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (refusing to consider the public purpose of improving
Bolivia's rural areas where the government hired a private company for program design and
implementation); Callejo, 764 F.2d at 1108-09 (issuing certificates of deposit in compliance
with a decree of the Mexican government was commercial in nature).
In 1986, the International Law Commission of the United Nations drafted a proposed
international codification of sovereign immunity containing several variations from the
United States statute. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its
Thirty-Eighth Session, 41 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 9-23, U.N. Doc. A/41/10 (1986).
Article 3(2) attempted to moderate the nature-purpose dichotomy by conceding that "the
purpose of the contract should also be taken into account if in the practice of that State
that purpose is relevant to determining the non-commercial character of the contract." Id.
For a detailed comparison of the Commission draft and the FSIA, see L. Weatherly Lowe,
The InternationalLaw Commission's Draft Articles on the Jurisdictional Immunities of
States and Their Property: The Commercial Contract Exception, 27 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 657 (1989).
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tivity according to its purpose. Weltover's rule of exclusion
presents the only way to avoid the danger of falling into the De
Sanchez trap.
IV.

DIRECT EFFECT

The commercial activity exception applies to sovereign activity outside the United States only if that activity has a direct effect
in the United States.12 Consequently, if it determines that a sovereign act was commercial in nature, the court must next determine
whether the activity had a "direct effect in the United States."8 It
is on this point that the circuits' analyses to direct effect diverge.
The majority of the circuits apply some version of a "substantial and foreseeable" test.8 ' Under this approach, the court looks to
see whether the sovereign activity had a substantial impact in the
United States and whether this impact was the directly foreseeable
result of the activity in question. The Second Circuit has a different approach. It requires a direct causal connection between the
sovereign's foreign commercial activity and the loss to the plaintiff,
together with minimum contacts sufficient for personal
jurisdiction. 5
A.

The Substantial and Foreseeable Approach

Section 1603(c) is a clear statutory command: the commercial
82. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). See supra note 6.
83. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)
84. Thus far, the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have
followed the "substantial" and "foreseeable" approach: Ohntrup v. Firearms Center Inc.,
516 F. Supp. 1281, 1286 (E.D. Pa. 1981), afl'd mem., 760 F.2d 259 (3rd Cir. 1985); Zernicek
v. Brown & Root, Inc., 826 F.2d 415, 417-18 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1043
(1988); Gould, Inc. v. Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann, 853 F.2d 445, 453 (6th Cir. 1988); RushPresbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Ctr. v. Hellenic Republic, 877 F.2d 574, 581-82 (7th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 937 (1989); America West Airlines, Inc. v. GPA Group, Ltd.,
877 F.2d 793, 798-99 (9th Cir. 1989); Zedan v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 849 F.2d 1511,
1514 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Harris Corp. v. Nat'l Iranian Radio & Television, 691 F.2d 1344, 1351
(11th Cir. 1982).
85. Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 314 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982). On the minimum contacts requirement, Texas
Trading derived four inquiries from International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945) and World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). The court must
examine: (1) the extent to which defendants availed themselves of the privileges of U.S. law;
(2) the extent to which litigation in the U.S. would be foreseeable to the defendants; (3) the
inconvenience to the defendants of litigating in the U.S. forum; and (4) the countervailing
U.S. interest in hearing the suit. Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 314.
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character of an activity is to be determined "by reference to the
nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act,
rather than by reference to its purpose."8 In contrast, the direct
effect clause of section 1605(a)(2) is rather vague: it denies immunity if a foreign sovereign's "act outside the territory of the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere . . .causes a direct effect in the United States. ' 87 As a
result, while the courts have easily defined commercial activity,
they have encountered difficulties in the direct effect
determination.
The House Report, unfortunately, offers little help on the application of the direct effect clause other than a rather ambiguous
reference to Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law. The
Report simply suggests that the third clause of section 1605(a)(2)
"would embrace commercial conduct abroad having direct effects
within the United States which would subject such conduct to the
exercise of jurisdiction by the United States consistent with principles set forth in Section 18, Restatement of the Law, Second, Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1965).'"1 s Section 18 employs the terms "substantial" and "foreseeable" to determine
whether American law should apply to extraterritorial conduct.8 9
While the purpose and context of section 18 are quite different
from that of section 1605(a)(2), most courts understood the House
Report as equating the two. Consequently, most courts adopted
the "substantial" and "foreseeable" language as a two-prong test in
the determination of the direct effect required by 1605(a)(2).
86. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d).
87. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
88. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 20, at 19.
89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18

(1965).
Section 18 of the Restatement (Second) provides, in pertinent part:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to
conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its territory,
if
(b)(i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to
which the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial;
(iii) it occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the
territory;and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of justice
generally recognized by states that have reasonably developed legal
systems.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18 (1965)(emphasis added). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 401-403 (1987) (adopting the substantial, direct, and foreseeable factors).
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Framed in this language, the direct effect determination essentially
turns on whether there is a substantial impact in the United
States that occurred as a directly foreseeable result of the foreign
conduct in question.
This traditional section 18 approach was used in America
West Airlines, Inc. v. GPA Group, Ltd.90 In that case, the Ninth
Circuit took great pains to re-establish the "substantial" and
"foreseeable" direct effect test after that same circuit had arguably
ignored this approach two years earlier. 9 In America West, two
corporations owned by the Republic of Ireland participated in an
engine maintenance job performed in Ireland on a Boeing 737 later
sold to America West Airlines. 2 During subsequent operation, the
engine stalled, caught fire, and was destroyed. America West Airlines sued the two corporations alleging its loss of the engine was a
direct effect of their negligent maintenance.9 3 Ireland asserted sovereign immunity. The Ninth Circuit agreed that sovereign immunity applied. The court held that the maintenance activities in Ireland could not have a foreseeable effect in the United'States
because the defendants were not aware that the engine would be
used in the United States. 4
In Zedan v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,9 5 the D.C. Circuit refused to find a direct effect where a U.S. engineer working in Saudi
Arabia for a Saudi corporation, returned to the United States to
sue the corporation for salary still owing. Zedan was employed by
the Saudi corporation to work on the Riyadh Outer Ring Road
Project." When the corporation faltered, the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Communication took over the project, guaranteed Zedan's
salary, and placed him in charge of the project's completion.
At the time he left Saudi Arabia to return home, Zedan had
not yet received the totality of his salary, but he was "assured"
90. 877 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1989).
91. See Meadows v. Dominican Republic, 817 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1987), which applied
the commercial activity exception where two American loan brokers were not paid the 2%
commission owed to them by the Dominican Republic for arranging a $12 million loan. The
Meadows court applied the commercial activity exception without even mentioning the
words "substantial" or "foreseeable."
92. America West Airlines, 877 F.2d at 795 n.2, 800.
93. Id. at 797.
94. Id. at 800. The court also held that the first clause of § 1605(a)(2) did not apply
because no nexus existed between the plaintiff's cause of action and the commercial activities of Ireland in the United States. Id. at 797.
95. 849 F.2d 1511 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
96. Id. at 1512.
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that the money would be forwarded to him.9 7 When Saudi Arabia
failed to pay, Zedan brought suit. He claimed that he suffered a
direct loss in the United States from the defendant's failure to pay.
The court applied the section 18 "substantial" and "foreseeable"
test to reject the claim. It reasoned that the action involved a
Saudi contract to be performed in Saudi Arabia and that the engineer did not have to return to the U.S. upon leaving Saudi Arabia.
Therefore, any financial hardship he suffered in the U.S. was
merely fortuitous and not a direct effect of Saudi Arabia's failure
to honor a contract in Saudi Arabia. 8 As the court observed: "The
jurisdiction of our courts cannot turn upon the happenstance of
[plaintiff's] travel arrangements." 99
B.

The Second Circuit Approach

The Second Circuit methodology stands in sharp contrast to
the other circuits' adherence to the "substantial" and "foreseeable" test. In Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic
of Nigeria,10 0 for example, U.S. corporations brought an action for
an anticipatory breach of contract by a foreign sovereign. The
court held that where the foreign sovereign met the constitutional
minimum contacts requirements to permit the court to exercise
personal jurisdiction over it, a breach or default that caused a direct financial loss to a U.S. company fulfilled the "in the United
States" requirement of the direct effect clause. 101 The court did
not use the "substantial and foreseeable test," in fact, it viewed the
House Report's reference to section 18 as "a bit of a non sequitur." 2 Since the Restatement concerns the extent to which
U.S. law applies to overseas acts rather than the jurisdiction of
U.S. courts, the court concluded that "the requirement[s] [of section 18] that the 'direct effect' be 'substantial' or 'foreseeable,' are
not necessarily apposite to the direct effect clause of
§ 1605(a)(2)."' 0 3 Thus, rather than using an unsuitable test, the
court instead focused on "Congress's concern with providing 'access to the courts' to those aggrieved by the commercial acts of a
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1514.
99. Id. -

100. 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
101. Id. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
102. Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 311.

103. Id. at 311 n.32.
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foreign sovereign."14

Since plaintiff in Texas Trading was a U.S. corporation, the
court expressly left unanswered the question "whether the failure
to pay a foreign corporation in the United. States . . . creates an
effect 'inthe United States' under § 1605(a)(2)."1 ° This is the issue addressed in Weltover.
C.

Weltover Direct Effect Analysis

Weltover focuses on the legal. significance of the place of payment option as the primary consideration in the direct effect determination. The foreign plaintiffs were holders in due course of the
bonds, which specified that payment would be made, at the creditor's option, into the holder's account in either New York, London,
Frankfurt, or Zurich. 10 6 Each plaintiff elected to receive payment
in New York.107 The court reasoned that Banco Central's failure to
make payment pursuant to the parties' contractual arrangement
caused a direct financial loss to the plaintiffs by depriving them of
10 8
capital to which they were legally entitled.
Unlike the plaintiffs in Texas Trading, the Weltover plaintiffs
were all foreign corporations with no other significant contacts to
the U.S. forum. The Weltover court thus squarely faced Texas
Trading's unanswered question: Does the direct effect exception
give the court jurisdiction in a case involving a defaulting foreign
sovereign and an injured foreign corporation?
Because the financial injury to the plaintiffs met the "direct
effect" requirement of section 1605(a)(2), the logical next step was
to determine where to locate the effect.1 09 The court drew on ear104. Id. at 312.
105. Id. (citations omitted). In a companion case, Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of
Nigeria, 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 461 U.S. 480 (1982), the Second Circuit held that
it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA to entertain a foreign corporation's
claim against the foreign sovereign on the same transaction. Id. The Second Circuit deemed
the scope of Article III of the United States Constitution, particularly the "arising under"
clause, too narrow to authorize a congressional grant of jurisdiction to the court over a suit
between an alien and a foreign sovereign. The United States Supreme Court reversed the
Second Circuit's constitutional ruling, holding that if an action satisfies the substantive
standards of the FSIA, a foreign defendant could bring it in federal court. Verlinden, 461
U.S. at 490-91.
106. Weltover, 753 F. Supp. at 1203.
107. 941 F.2d at 147.
108. Id. at 152.
109. Texas Trading did not find it necessary to make this distinction since its facts
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lier Second Circuit decisions"1 indicating that "[a]n injury to a
corporation occurs in some legally significant situs, for instance,
... the place designated for performance of a contract." ' '
Weltover's placement of the effect at the designated place of performance finds support in other circuits as well. In dictum, the
court in Zedan suggested that the breach of a contract involving
activity carried on entirely outside the United States might have a
direct effect in the United States if the contract specified "a particular location in the United States, even perhaps the particular
bank through which payment was to be made .... "I"
Although not citing to Zedan on that point, the Weltover
court used the same reasoning and focused on the legal significance
of the breach of contract. It determined that the failure to pay in
New York made New York the situs of the injury in the first instance." 3 Thus, a breach causing a direct deprivation of a contractual right is a legally significant act causing a direct effect in the
expected place of performance." 4
included American corporations with loss incurred in the United States. See Texas Trading,
647 F.2d at 312.
110. International Housing Ltd. v. Rafidain Bank Iraq, 893 F.2d 8, 11 n.3 (2d Cir. 1989)
(involving a housing construction contract between a Cayman Islands corporation and the
government of Iraq in which there were partial payments to a New York bank account despite the absence of a New York payment provision).
111. Id. (citing L'Europeenne de Banque v. La Republica de Venezuela, 700 F. Supp.
114, 121-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (involving a consortium of banks, including one U.S. bank,
where the only reference to payment in the agreement was to the account of the foreign
agent bank in U.S. dollars)).
112. Zedan, 849 F.2d at 1515 n.2. Courts have interpreted Zedan to stand for the proposition that the absence of a legally significant act in the United States prevents the invocation of the direct effect clause of the commercial activity exception. See, e.g., Weltover,
941 F.2d at 152; America West Airlines, Inc. v. GPA Group, Ltd., 877 F.2d 793, 799 (9th Cir.
1989); Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515, 1527 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 891 (1989).
113. Weltover, 941 F.2d at 153.
114. Id. at 152. Shortly after Weltover, the Second Circuit refused to broaden the legally significant situs consideration in a breach of contract to a tort application. In Antares
Aircraft, L.P. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, No. 90-7342, 1991 WL 219088 (2d Cir. Oct. 28,
1991), an American plaintiff incurred a financial loss in the United States as a result of the
legally significant detention and alleged conversion of an aircraft. The Nigerian Airports
Authority ("NAA") demanded that Antares Aircraft, a Delaware limited partnership, pay
airport parking and landing fees left unpaid by Antares' former lessee. Id. at *2. Antares
wired the funds from its New York bank to Nigeria. Id. Although Antares claimed that the
NAA directed one of several payments to a California bank account, the court rejected the
attempt to characterize this payment as the place of performance. Id. at *5.The legally
significant detention and alleged conversion of the aircraft occurred in Nigeria, and there
was no contractual right to payment in the United States even if the NAA was suing. Financial loss in the United States is a direct effect, but as Weltover made clear, the situs of the
effect is the location of the legally significant act. Weltover, 941 F.2d at 152.

1991-92]

WELTOVER v. ARGENTINA

1. Contract and Choice-of-Law Principles
By isolating the payment option in the bonds, Weltover focuses the direct effect analysis on the deprivation of the plaintiffs'
contractual rights. 1 8 Implicit in the court's emphasis on the contractual right to receive payment in New York is the notion that
Argentina obtained a benefit from the investors' reliance on the
ability to collect in that city. 11 6 Argentina's contract offered bond
holders four cities known as international banking centers. It
would be fanciful to presume that sophisticated debtors in a complex international refinancing arrangement,'1 7 like Argentina and
Banco Central, were ignorant of the intrinsic value of the New
York place of payment option. The place of payment option was
therefore part of the consideration for extending credit.
Weltover implicates international legal principles of freedom
of contract and pacta sunt servanda"s by upholding the ability to
enforce the bond provision according to the parties' expectations.
This is especially true in the absence of a choice of forum clause in
the "Bonods." Combining these principles with the FSIA exceptions results in the advancement of an autonomous international
commercial law.11 9
That both the D.C. Circuit in Zedan and the Second Circuit'in
Weltover intuitively looked to the place of performance suggests
that a comparison in a different context may prove valuable in
resolving at least part of the section 1605(a)(2) riddle. Although
neither Weltover nor Zedan dealt with conflict of laws issues, the
result in Weltover-and the tentative statement of Zedan-look
surprisingly like the traditional choice-of-law rule that applies the
law of the place of performance to determine questions involving
1 20
breach of contract.
The suggestion is not that the courts would necessarily apply
115. Weltover, 941 F.2d at 152.
116. The provision for payment in New York "was not so much an enhancement of the
Bonods as it was necessary to give the transaction the air of authenticity." Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 16, Weltover (No. 91-7119).
117. Weltover, 941 F.2d at 147.
118. It is a basic, universally accepted principle of contract law that parties' contracted
agreements must be observed. 1 F.V. GARCIA-AMADOR, THE CHANGING LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
CLAIMS

385 (1984).

119. Aleksander Goldstajn, Reflections on the Structure of the Modern Law of International Trade, in INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS AND CONFLICTS OF LAWS 14, 27 (Petar Sarcevic
ed., 1990).
120. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 370 (1934).
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the substantive law of the place of performance; the sole issue in
both cases was plainly subject matter jurisdiction. 2 ' Rather, the
significance of the original place of performance rule lies in the values which support it and how those values neatly parallel both the
objectives of the FSIA and the needs of the international
marketplace.
The pragmatic reason for the rule, especially in contracts involving the repayment of money is, obviously, that "[riepayment is
the ultimate aim and objective of the contract, and the place where
the contract requires that payment be made will naturally loom
large in the minds of the parties."12' 2 Argentina was certainly deliberate in its choice of New York as a possible place of payment.
Likewise, the plaintiffs' election of New York is a strong indication
that they envisioned recourse to New York courts in the event of
default by the debtor. 12 3 As the quotation above suggests, the New
York option "naturally loomed large" in security-sensitive investors' decisions to purchase Bonods rather than lend elsewhere. To
deny them the implicit benefit of their bargain could indeed undermine the confidence of the international
financial community in
24
New York as a world financial leader.1
The Zedan plaintiff, in contrast, went to Saudi Arabia, performed services there, and expected to be paid there." 5 Aside from
a vague "assurance" that his salary would be forwarded to him,
every aspect of Zedan's employment contract pointed to Saudi
Arabia as the place of performance. Payment in the U.S. was not
part of the original bargain. It is unlikely that, as an additional
inducement to work overseas, the Saudi government promised to
forward payment in the U.S., or wherever Zedan went. 2 Thus,
any financial hardship in the U.S. resulted not from Saudi Arabia's
breach of contract but from Zedan's unilateral choice to return to
121. Apparently the contracts in both Weltover and Zedan lacked choice-of-forum
clauses. And while the case is silent on the question, the Weltover debenture bonds may
very well contain choice-of-law provisions.
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 195 cmt. b (1971).
123. This is especially true in the absence of a choice of forum clause in the debt instrument. It would explain in part why a Swiss bank chose New York rather than Zurich as
the place of payment.
124. 941 F.2d at 153.
125. Zedan, 849 F.2d at 1514.
126. Id. at 1514. On the contrary, the plaintiff in Zedan attempted, unsuccessfully, to
establish a subsequent modification of the original agreement to receive payment in Saudi
Arabia. This modification was purportedly made just prior to his departure from Saudi
Arabia.
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the States. Unlike the situation in Zedan, nothing in Weltover suggests the parties were litigating in the U.S. by mere happenstance.' 2 7 By all appearances, New York's financial reputation and
the expertise of its courts were inextricably wrapped up in the underlying transactions giving rise to the action from beginning to
end.
The traditional values of certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result which are advanced by the place of performance
rule,'2 8 are the very same values Congress sought to promote in
enacting the FSIA. They are also of paramount importance to business planning. Argentina's status as a foreign sovereign presents
no compelling reason to depart from those core values. Allowing
foreign sovereigns to enter the market as commercial actors, only
to raise a cloak of immunity to avoid their contractual obligations
in U.S. courts, would introduce a high degree of uncertainty in the
already rapidly changing world of international commerce. The effect of a loss of international investor confidence is difficult to predict. But the potential effect on U.S. banking reserves could be
drastic.
2.

Public Policy

A final consideration in the direct effect determination is "the
ultimate FSIA question: Would Congress have wanted an American court to entertain an action such as the present one?" 2 s In
answering this question, the Weltover court considered the United
States' interest in preserving or enhancing New York's status as a
world financial leader. 130 The court cites Allied Bank Int'l v.
3
Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago1
1 as support for the statement
"that public policy should make American courts available to foreign plaintiffs if this will preserve or even enhance New York's status as a world financial leader."' 3 2
127. One could argue that it was mere chance (one in four) that the Weltover plaintiffs
picked New York, rather than London, Frankfurt, or Zurich as the place of payment. After
all, had they picked another of the option cities, this case would not be in U.S. courts at all.
However, the defendants would also have to concede that they gave the plaintiffs that
choice as part of the bargain. The defendants' breach of the contract led to the action in the
first place
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 195 cmt. b (1971).
129. Weltover, 941 F.2d at 153.
130. Id.
131. 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 473 U.S. 934 (1985).
132. Weltover, 941 F.2d at 153.
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Even though Allied Bank primarily addresses the act of state
doctrine, the facts of the case are very similar to those of Weltover.
In Allied Bank, a syndicate of thirty-nine banks received promissory notes from the Central Bank of Costa Rica as a rollover of the
debt owed by a failed bank undergoing reorganization.1 3 3 Just like
Banco Central de la Argentina in Weltover, the Central Bank of
Costa Rica, "in response to escalating national economic
problems,' 1 34 established debt regulations and the Costa Rican
government issued a decree establishing the authority of the Central Bank to control all payments of external debt. The United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York found
that the commercial activity exception applied, but that the act of
state doctrine prevented recovery.13 The Second Circuit affirmed,
but later reversed itself on rehearing when the United States filed
an amicus brief criticizing "Costa Rica's attempted unilateral restructuring of private obligations.' ' 3 6 The potential embarrassment
to U.S.-Costa Rican relations 37 resulting from a United States
court passing judgment on Costa Rica's action was not sufficient
justification to prevent the syndicate from obtaining jurisdiction,
especially where the notes designated New York as the place of
payment and forum for suit.'
In Weltover, the debentures did not specify New York as the
133. Allied Bank, 757 F.2d at 518 n.1.
134. Id. at 519.
135. Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola, 566 F. Supp. 1440, 1442-43 (S.D.N.Y.
1983), rev'd, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 473 U.S. .934 (1985).
A flood of commentary on the relationship between the act of state doctrine and the
FSIA followed the Allied decision. See, e.g., Ifeanyi Achebe, The Act of State Doctrine and
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Can They Coexist?, 13 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE
247 (1989); Jane K. Cristal, The ABA's Proposed Amendment to the FSIA-Another Futile
Attempt to Limit U.S. Court Application of the Act of State Doctrine?, 3 INT'L PROP. INVESTMENT J. 279 (1987); Robert S. Rendell, The Allied Bank Case and Its Aftermath, 20
INT'L LAW. 819 (1986); Carsten T. Ebenroth & Louise E. Teitz, Winning (or Losing) by
Default: The Act of State Doctrine, Sovereign Immunity and Comity in InternationalBusiness Transactions, 19 INT'L LAW. 225 (1985).
136. Allied Bank, 757 F.2d at 519. See also Rendell, supra note 135, at 824 ("the intervention of the U.S. government in this litigation effectively turned the tide in favor of the
plaintiff.").
137. Allied Bank, 566 F. Supp. at 1442. Would the same embarrassment standard apply
to an action against the United States? The Third Circuit has pointed out the one-sidedness
of the FSIA, referencing Article I, § 9 of the United States Constitution: "No Money shall
be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law." The
United States Treasury appears to be absolutely immune from foreign judgments without
an act of Congress declaring its liability. Rex v. Cia. Pervana de Vapores, S.A., 660 F.2d 61,
71 (3rd Cir. 1981).
138. 757 F.2d at 521.
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forum for suit,13 9 solely as the place of payment. This was, however, sufficient cause for the Weltover court to. invoke the interest
of the United States in maintaining New York's global financial
leadership. 14 0 The court reasoned that the concerns enunciated in
Allied in relation to the act of state doctrine remained just as valid
in the context of the FSIA. They "have an equally direct bearing
on the interest of New York in encouraging foreign debtors to pay
their debts that are due in New York even though the plaintiffs are
not domiciled in New York."''
The Justice Department amicus brief in Allied emphasized
that "[t]he confidence of lenders in the enforceability of their loan
agreements payable in New York is critical to their willingness to
extend international credit.' 1 42 The Weltover court bolstered its
direct effect analysis with the same policy concerns. Yet, the policy
in favor of protecting the confidence of lenders is not nearly so
one-sided as it may first appear. Loss of investor confidence carries
a concomitant risk of devastating consequences, particularly for
Latin American countries where, despite recent economic improvement, the debt burden remains at crisis levels.1 43 Without a means
139. The absence of a choice of forum clause does not localize the contract when Argentina is aware that, in the absence of such a clause, foreign courts might accept jurisdiction.
INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS § 7.01[1] (Hans Smit et al. eds., 1981). Argentina exhibited its
awareness by including a clause waiving immunity in the issuance of promissory notes.
140. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petition for
Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 1-2 Allied Bank (No. 83-7714) ("The
United States has a strong interest in. . . the legal framework applicable to the payment of
billions of dollars of loans contracted by foreign governments and foreign private parties
for which New York is the place of payment under the contract."
Since most of the debt in default is owed by Latin America, this policy argument would
be very useful in an action to enforce such debt in Miami. See e.g., Dian Vujovich, Latin
America May Be Next Stop for Investors, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 23, 1991, Business Monday
section, at 50; Gail De.George et al., Latin America's Newest Capital City: Miami, Bus.
WEEK, Sept. 30, 1991, at 120.
141. Weltover, 941 F.2d at 153. The Weltover defendants asserted that the act of state
doctrine is concerned with the impact on international relations while direct effect analysis
involves the "particular and tangible harm to the plaintiff"). Reply Brief for DefendantsAppellants at 15, Weltover (No. 91-7119). Even assuming the validity of the distinction for
the moment, given the potential market failure that closing the doors of U.S. courts in this
case might cause, it offers little comfort to Argentina or other similarly situated nations.
142. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 5-6, Allied Bank Int'l v. Bank Credito
Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985) (No. 83-7714).
143. Cf. Debt Crisis in Latin America Under Control, Bankers Say, MIAMI HERALD,
Oct. 1, 1991, at 5B (Latin America is still burdened with $425 billion in debt but the net
capital flow was positive for the first time since 1982); A Gateway for Latin Trade, MIAMI
HERALD, Sept. 16, 1991, Business Monday section, at 24 (Latin America rebounding from
previous financial crisis).

488

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:2

of enforcement, the risk rating of the bond would soar and the foreign governments, particularly that of Argentina, would be unable
to afford the interest premium demands of foreign investors.
V.

WELTOVER AS A MEANS OF RECONCILIATION

While other circuits may adopt Weltover's bright-line rule
concerning the determination of commercial activity, it is uncertain that they will do the same with respect to the direct effect
test. This divergence stems primarily from the circuits' disparate
interpretation of the House Report's reference to section 18 of the
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law.
As previously noted,"' the Second Circuit has long considered
the House Report's reference to section 18 a "non sequitur 145 because the direct effect requirement concerns jurisdiction, whereas
section 18 concerns the right to prescribe American law to foreign
matters. 146 This criticism, however, is unwarranted because it overstates the significance, and thereby the intent, of the House Report's reference to section 18. The Report urges only that the direct effect determination be "consistent with principles set forth in
section 18. '' 147 It does not incorporate the substantive law of foreign relations in its guidelines. The principles of section 18 of the
Restatement are simply guidelines; not statutory commands.
It follows, therefore, that a direct effect analysis not inconsistent with the general principles of section 18 will meet the admittedly slight guidance the House Report gives courts in applying the
third clause of section 1605(a)(2). This position comports with
Congressional intent to leave sovereign immunity determinations
to the courts.
If reference to section 18 is merely broad guidance, the courts
should be able to conform with congressional intent without strict
application of the "substantial" and "foreseeable" language.
Weltover cautioned that "rather than getting steeped in the metaphysics of such amorphous terms . . . courts must be concerned
with Congress's goal of opening the courthouse doors 'to those ag144. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
145. Id. Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 311. Accord Weltover, 941 F.2d at 152.
146. But cf. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 490 (1983) ("Congress . . .enact[ed] substantive provisions [in the commercial activity exception] requiring
some form of substantial contact with the United States").
147. HousE REPORT, supra note 20, at 19 (emphasis added).
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grieved by the commercial acts of a foreign sovereign.' "148 In other
words, the question was not whether the facts fit neatly within a
certain test, but whether Congress's intent in enacting the FSIA
would be served if the court decided to hear the case. Hence, in
reaching its decision, the Weltover court looked not to a narrow
rule of law but rather to the whole transaction. It focused on the
expectations of the parties as well as on the public policy concerns
of both the forum state and the international business community.
The key to reconciling the "substantial and foreseeable" jurisdictions with the Second Circuit's more flexible approach can be
found in Zedan v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia."9 While Zedan applied the "substantial and foreseeable test," it did so by interpreting it to mean that "something legally significant actually happened in the United States."' 50 Although some commentators have
interpreted Zedan as adding,a third requirement to the substantial
and foreseeable approach, 15' the commentators are not necessarily
correct. Rather than adding a third requirement, Zedan provides a
more precise substitute for the unsatisfactory "substantial and
foreseeable" test: "Something legally significant actually happened
in the United States . . . . [T]herefore, the foreign sovereign
caused a 'substantial' and 'direct and foreseeable' effect in the
1 52
United States.
Unlike the vague "substantial and foreseeable" formula, the
"legally significant act" is better suited to fulfill Congress's intent
in enacting the FSIA. A legally significant act is identifiable by its
occurrence; it has a specific place and time. In Weltover the failure
to credit the plaintiffs' New York bank accounts had legal significance for the purposes of the FSIA because the parties specifically
contracted that payment would be made in New York. Had they
148. Weltover, 941 F.2d at 151 (citing Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 312).
149. 849 F.2d 1511 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
150. Id. at 1515.
151. See Renana B. Abrams, Comment, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Inconsistencies in Application of the Commercial Activity Direct Effect Exception, 5 EMoRY
INT'L L. REV. 211, 234-40 (1991); Lori E. Corwin, Jurisdiction-ForeignSovereign Immunities Act-Commercial Activity/Direct Effect Exception, Zedan v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
13 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 899, 909 n.48 (1990) (criticizes court for not following other
cases finding legally significant, substantial, and foreseeable occurrences).
152. Zedan, 849 F.2d at 1515. See Transamerican Steamship Corp. v. Somali Democratic Republic, 767 F.2d 998, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("a significant transaction was effectuated in the United States"). Cf. America West Airlines, 877 F.2d at 799 (interprets Zedan
as a narrow application of Texas Trading, thereby preserving the substantial and foreseeable approach).
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instead agreed that payment would be made in London or Zurich
the defendants' breach would have lacked legal significance under
the Act, just as the Saudi government's "assurance" in Zedan
lacked legal significance.1 3
Thus, the "legally significant act" avoids the court's subjective
interpretation of the "substantial" and "foreseeable" language and
yields the certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result that
Congress sought to achieve."" The "substantial and foreseeable"
test provides no foundation for direct effect analysis. Instead, it is
an epistemological exercise that inevitably yields inconsistent
results.
Weltover simply suggests that the other circuits' approach is
too narrow to achieve liberality in direct effect analysis. The
Weltover court was concerned with "the interests of the forum...
in controlling conduct within its borders."1'55 Coupled with these
domestic "interests" is a general concern for the rapidly changing
structure of the global financial market. To maintain the economic
status of the United States and to ensure the continued trust of
international investors, 56 the law requires a more dynamic and
flexible model than the "substantial and foreseeable" test. 57
Weltover is such a model.
153. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text. Of course, both approaches must
first satisfy due process. However, when the constitutional minimum due process requirements for personal jurisdiction are met, either approach will already have most, if not all the
contacts necessary to fulfill the commercial activity direct effect exception. For Weltover's
minimum contacts analysis see Weltover, 753 F. Supp. at 1208. See also supra note 85 (addressing Texas Trading's minimum contacts inquiry).
Several commentators would use World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286
(1980) to satisfy the "direct effect" requirement of the FSIA. See, e.g., Christopher J.
Papajohn, Note, Effects Jurisdiction Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: How
Far Does the Long Arm Reach?, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 463 (1988); Lorna J. Schofield,
Note, Effects Jurisdiction Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the Due Process Clause, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 474 (1980); Philip D. Wheeler, Note, Direct Effect Jurisdiction Under the FSIA of 1976, 13 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 571 (1981).
154. See supra notes 20-34 and accompanying text.
155. Weltover, 941 F.2d at 152.
156. See Weltover, 941 F.2d at 153 (position that the U.S. has an interest in protecting
the foreign plaintiff from breach "has been building in the district courts for several years")
(citing Int'l Housing Ltd. v. Rafidain Bank Iraq, 893 F.2d 8, 13 (2d Cir. 1989) (Kaufman, J.,
dissenting)).
157. Contra Charles D. Day, Note, L'Europeenne de Banque v. La Republica de Venezuela: UnnecessarilyPermitting Foreign Plaintiffs to Sue Foreign Governments Under the
ForeignSovereign Immunities Act, 17 BROOKLYN J. INT'L. L. 165, 167 (1991) (suggesting that
courts should strictly adhere to the section 18 reference).
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VI.

CONCLUSION

Debt issuance by a foreign sovereign in the commercial marketplace is a commercial activity regardless of the end-use of the
funds or the occurrence of intervening governmental acts such as
currency controls. Weltover reinforces the commercial nature of
the debt issuance by adhering to the statutory determination requirements and by distinguishing prior case law which appears to
waiver from these requirements.
In contrast to the commercial activity determination,
Weltover urges a more flexible approach for finding a direct effect
in the United States. Weltover rejects the narrow "substantial"
and "foreseeable" formula, and instead emphasizes the need to include a variety of considerations in the direct effect determination
depending on the circumstances. For breach of sovereign debt instruments, Weltover suggests that these considerations include
congressional goals in enacting the FSIA, contract theory and the
principles embedded in traditional choice-of-law rules, as well as
public policy considerations. This model provides a foundation for
a comprehensive and judicially flexible approach to direct effects
analysis. Circumstances may justify judicially developed flexibility
as long as the application of the FSIA remains neutral and
consistent.
The Second Circuit recognizes the need for greater judicial adaptation in the changing context of the FSIA. While the Second
Circuit arguably has the most at stake in the judicial management
of the global financial leader of New York, several other circuits
would be wise to prepare for their jurisdiction's increasing global
influence-the Third, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits perhaps.
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